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INTRODUCTION

S

ince the end of the United States Supreme Court’s “Lochner era” in
1936, federal and state legislators have had unbridled authority to
regulate economic matters in the United States. Having determined that
the legislature is the arm of government best-suited to make such regulatory decisions, the Supreme Court announced that constitutionally
challenged economic legislation would be subjected to the most deferential standard of judicial review.1 On the international stage—particularly
in the wake of the global financial crisis that began in 2007—one would
expect judicial deference toward socioeconomic regulation to be a foregone conclusion. However, the United Nations Human Rights Committee (the “Committee”) has actually harked back to a brand of judicial
scrutiny reminiscent of the Lochner era, having recently condemned
certain types of public interest legislation as incompatible with international equal protection.2
The Human Rights Committee was established after the entry into
force of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(“ICCPR”) in 1976 and is now the primary international body charged
with monitoring the implementation of this important human rights
treaty.3 Meeting regularly in Geneva and New York, the Committee is
comprised of 18 individual experts reviewing formal complaints of international human rights violations and rendering responsive opinions
(known as “views”) under the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR.4 Since its
inception, the Committee has amassed a substantial body of recommen1. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938) (“[L]egislation
affecting ordinary commercial transactions is not to be pronounced unconstitutional
unless[,] in the light of the facts made known or generally assumed[,] it is of such a
character as to preclude the assumption that it rests upon some rational basis within the
knowledge and experience of the legislators.”).
2. See infra Part I.A.
3. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, open for signature Dec. 19,
1966, S. Treaty Doc. No. 95-20, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]. For a comprehensive account of the judgments, see MANFRED NOWAK, UN COVENANT ON CIVIL AND
POLITICAL RIGHTS: CCPR COMMENTARY (2d rev. ed. 2005); Nisuke Ando, The Evolution
and Problems of the Jurisprudence of the Human Rights Committee’s Views Concerning
Article 26, in TOWARDS IMPLEMENTING UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS 205, 205–24 (Nisuke
Ando ed., 2004); Tufyal Choudhury, Interpreting the Right to Equality Under Article 26
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 8 EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 24
(2003); Christian Tomuschat, The Human Rights Committee’s Jurisprudence on Article
26 – A Pyrrhic Victory?, in TOWARDS IMPLEMENTING UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS 225,
225–43 (Nisuke Ando ed., 2004).
4. Human Rights—Civil and Political Rights: The Human Rights Committee,
HUMAN RIGHTS FACT SHEET NO. 15 (U.N. Hum. Rts. Committee, New York, N.Y.), May
2005, at 12–14.
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dations, and several have dealt with the principle of nondiscrimination.5
It has been in this context that the Committee’s recommendations bear
resemblance to Lochner era adjudication.
The principle of nondiscrimination prohibits any distinction, exclusion,
restriction, or preference that is based on any grounds, such as race,
color, or other identifiable individual or group distinctions.6 Most early
cases before the Committee concerned claims of narrowly defined discrimination in the enjoyment of civil and political rights under the
ICCPR, but more recently, the Committee has reviewed a broader range
of disputes involving social and economic legislation.7 Recent views
have demonstrated the Committee’s willingness to expand the meaning
of “equal protection” under the ICCPR, and, given the subject matter
underlying the disputes in question, there is reason to believe the Committee will find issues of equal protection increasingly relevant to the
propriety of certain types of socioeconomic legislative measures in the

5. See Karakurt v. Austria (Communication No. 965/2000), reprinted in U.N. Hum.
Rts. Comm., Report of the Human Rights Committee, at 304, U.N. Doc. A/57/40 (Jan. 1,
2002) [hereinafter Karakurt v. Austria]; Des Fours Walderode v. Czech Republic (Communication No. 747/1997), reprinted in U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., Report of the Human
Rights Committee, at 88, U.N. Doc. A/57/40 (Jan. 1, 2002) [hereinafter Des Fours Walderode v. Czech Republic]; Vos v. Netherlands (Communication No. 786/1997), reprinted
in U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., Report of the Human Rights Committee, at 271, U.N. Doc.
A/54/40 (Jan. 1, 2000) [hereinafter Vos v. Netherlands]; Adam v. Czech Republic (Communication No. 586/1994), reprinted in U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., Report of the Human
Rights Committee, at 165, U.N. Doc. A/51/40 (May 17, 1997) [hereinafter Adam v. Czech
Republic]; Simunek v. Czech Republic (Communication No. 516/1992), reprinted in U.N.
Hum. Rts. Comm., Report of the Human Rights Committee, at 89, U.N. Doc. A/50/40
(Jan. 22, 1999) [hereinafter Simunek v. Czech Republic]; Pepels v. Netherlands (Communication No. 484/1991), reprinted in U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., Report of the Human
Rights Committee, at 221, U.N. Doc. A/49/40 (Sept. 21, 1994) [hereinafter Pepels v.
Netherlands]; Pauger v. Austria (Communication No. 415/1990), reprinted in U.N. Hum.
Rts. Comm., Report of the Human Rights Committee, at 325, U.N. Doc. A/47/40 (Oct. 9,
1992) [hereinafter Pauger v. Austria]; Zwaan-de Vries v. Netherlands (Communication
No. 182/1984), reprinted in U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., Report of the Human Rights Committee, at 160, U.N. Doc. A/42/40 (Aug. 28, 1987) [hereinafter Zwaan-de Vries v. Netherlands].
6. U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., Report of the Human Rights Committee: General Comment No. 18, ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. A/45/40 (Nov. 11, 1989) [hereinafter General Comment No.
18].
7. This development began in 1987 when the Committee dealt with gender discrimination in socio-economic legislation. See Zwaan-de Vries v. Netherlands, supra note 5.
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future.8 Thus far, the Committee has already applied rigorous scrutiny to
such measures.9
While the Committee’s jurisprudential ideology differs from the
laissez-faire capitalism of the Lochner Court—it aims instead to protect
the interests of disadvantaged citizens—their standard of judicial scrutiny
is similarly demanding.10 As a result, the Committee has deemed a number of laws incompatible with international human rights and the
ICCPR.11 Though the efforts of the Human Rights Committee to enhance
equality on the international level are well-intentioned, these efforts may
have a chilling effect on the future enactment of important socioeconomic
legislation. Socioeconomic legislation is often, by necessity, based on
distinctions among groups, as it is designed in pursuit of public interests.
If legislation is rejected as discriminatory because the Human Rights
Committee is prone to second-guess the legislature’s rationale, the legislature may be tempted to avoid enacting such laws in the first place.
Thus, it is necessary to work toward developing a more thoughtful
approach to international equal protection going forward. International
judicial organs should carefully evaluate the implications of their jurisprudence before introducing a sweeping interpretation of equality that
does not adequately represent international human rights standards.
Of course, the Committee’s approach is only part of a broader trend to
extend the scope of the nondiscrimination principle to the international
plane.12 A central problem with the Committee’s methodology arises
from the concept of international equal protection itself, since the term’s
precise meaning is still essentially unsettled. The opaqueness of the nondiscrimination provision calls for a clearly enunciated conceptualization
and begs the question whether there is a generalized human rights norm
to treat all persons equally, or whether international law is only concerned with certain invidious distinctions. Since the case-by-case
approach applied by international human rights institutions lacks
coherence at present, adjudicative bodies should look to the experience
8. See Haraldsson and Sveinsson v. Iceland, (Communication No. 1306/2004), U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/91/D/1306/2004 [hereinafter Haraldsson and Sveinsson].
9. See id.
10. See infra Part I.A. Another difference is the fact that the Lochner Court applied
economic due process while the Human Rights Committee applies equal protection
analysis. But, in effect, both rationales can be used to invalidate economic legislation.
11. See, e.g., Haraldsson and Sveinsson, supra note 8.
12. In 2001, the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights interpreted Article 24
of the American Convention on Human Rights as embodying a general principle of nondiscrimination, which would then be applicable to socio-economic cases. Morales de
Sierra v. Guatemala, Case 11.625, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 4/01, OEA/Ser./L/V/
II.111, doc. 20 rev. ¶ 31 (2001).
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gained over time under domestic equal protection jurisprudence in order
to refine their approach.
In this Article, I explore the most recent developments in international
jurisprudence in order to evaluate the consequences of such developments critically and make suggestions for the future of nondiscrimination
analysis. In Part I of this Article, I will explain the expanding role of
equal protection in international law, and highlight jurisprudential shortcomings and misconceptions within recent Human Rights Committee
views. In Part II, I will examine equal protection interpretation under
various domestic constitutional regimes and argue that such comparative
analysis should guide international equal protection application. Finally,
in Part III, I will propose a coherent doctrinal framework for the future of
international equal protection jurisprudence.
I. THE SPREAD OF INTERNATIONAL EQUAL PROTECTION
The principles of nondiscrimination and equal protection have been on
the dockets of international human rights institutions for decades, and
various conventions and treaty mechanisms have been established in
order to deal with specific types of discrimination.13 Still, while the
concept of “equal protection” is embedded in the existing comprehensive
human rights instruments, the exact meaning of the term as used in
various clauses requires clarification.
Whereas the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Racial Discrimination14 and the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women15 are tailored
to specific distinctions, the ICCPR and the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”)16 both prohibit general
discriminatory application of domestic laws based on distinctions provided within the covenants themselves.17 Such prohibited grounds of dis13. See International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination, opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, S. Treaty Doc. 95-18, 660 U.N.T.S. 195; Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, adopted Dec.
18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, adopted and opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, S. Treaty Doc. No. 95-19, 993
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR].
14. International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination, supra note 13.
15. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women,
supra note 13.
16. ICESCR, supra note 13.
17. For a comparison of the nondiscrimination provisions under the different human
rights treaties, see Aileen McColgan, Principles of Equality and Protection From
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crimination include: “race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or
other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth, or other status.”18
Article 1 of the American Convention on Human Rights19 and Article 14
of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms prohibit discrimination on identical grounds.20
While these provisions spell out an accessory right, providing only for
the equal enjoyment of conventional rights, Article 26 of the ICCPR goes
Discrimination in International Human Rights Law, 2003 EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 157,
157–75 (2003). Further examples of Conventions pertaining to the prevention of discrimination are the following: International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment
of the Crime of Apartheid, open for signature Nov. 30, 1973, 1015 U.N.T.S. 243; International Convention against Apartheid in Sports, adopted Dec. 10, 1985, 1500 U.N.T.S.
161; International Labor Organization, Convention concerning discrimination in respect
of employment and occupation, adopted June 25, 1958, 362 U.N.T.S. 31; Convention
against Discrimination in Education, adopted Dec. 14, 1960, 429 U.N.T.S. 93; International Labor Organization, Convention concerning equal remuneration for men and
women workers for work of equal value, adopted June 29, 1951, 165 U.N.T.S. 303. See
also, CASES, MATERIALS AND TEXT ON NATIONAL, SUPRANATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL
NON-DISCRIMINATION LAW (Dagmar Schiek et. al. eds., 2007).
18. The ICCPR reads:
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to
all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin,
property, birth or other status.
ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 2, ¶ 1. See also, ICESCR, supra note 13, art. 2, ¶ 2. For the
guarantee of equal enjoyment of the Covenant rights to men and women, see ICCPR,
supra note 3, art. 3.
19. Article 1, paragraph 1 reads:
The States Parties to this Convention undertake to respect the rights and freedoms recognized herein and to ensure to all persons subject to their jurisdiction
the free and full exercise of those rights and freedoms, without any discrimination for reasons of race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, economic status, birth, or any other social condition.
American Convention on Human Rights “Pact of San José, Costa Rica”, adopted Nov.
22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, art. 1(1) [hereinafter ACHR].
20. Art. 14 of the Convention states:
The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be
secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association
with a national minority, property, birth or other status.
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened for
signature Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, art. 14.

2010]

THE RISE OF EQUALITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

7

even further21 by referring to equal protection “before the law” as a matter of formal equality and equal protection “of the law” as a matter of
substantive equality, and by neglecting to limit the Article’s application
to the rights enumerated in the Covenant.22 The American Convention on
Human Rights also provides for a comprehensive right to equal protection.23 No such general provision is found in the European Convention.
However, Protocol No. 12 to the European Convention, promulgated in
2005, extends the nondiscrimination principle beyond the scope of conventional rights24 by providing for a general prohibition of discrimination, which applies to any right set forth by law.25
Though the nondiscrimination principle has generally been recognized
in various treaties, the search continues for a more fleshed out interpretation. As the body called upon to apply and interpret the ICCPR, the
Human Rights Committee has dealt extensively with the meaning of
“equal protection of the law.”26 As compared to Article 2(1), the broad
21. Article 26 states:
All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination
to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against
discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.
ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 26.
22. Torkel Opsahl, Equality in Human Rights Law: With Particular Reference to
Article 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, in FORTSCHRITT IM
BEWUSSTSEIN DER GRUNDUND MENSCHENRECHTE [PROGRESS IN THE SPIRIT OF HUMAN
RIGHTS] 51 (Manfred Nowak et al. eds., 1988); see Syméon Karagiannis, Considérations
sur l’article 26 du Pacte des Nations Unies relatif aux droits civils et politiques, in LES
DROITS DE L’HOMME AU SEUIL DU TROISIÈME MILLÉNAIRE: MÉLANGES EN HOMMAGE À
PIERRE LAMBERT 467–97 (Pierre Lambert ed., 2000).
23. The Convention notes that “[a]ll persons are equal before the law. Consequently,
they are entitled, without discrimination, to equal protection of the law.” ACHR, supra
note 19, art. 24.
24. Protocol No. 12 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened for signature Nov. 4, 2000, Europ. T.S. No. 177 [hereinafter
Protocol No. 12].
25. Article 1, paragraph 1 of the Protocol states:
The enjoyment of any right set forth by law shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or
other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority,
property, birth or other status.
Protocol No. 12, supra note 24, at 2, art. 1, ¶ 1.
26. See cases cited supra note 5.
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wording of Article 26 has led the Committee to deal with a considerable
number of discrimination cases that, upon first glance, would not appear
to fall within the realm of civil and political rights.27 By 1987, the Committee had already determined that Article 26 prohibits discrimination in
law or in practice in any area regulated and protected by public authorities, including unemployment benefits.28
This line of jurisprudence is of particular relevance to cases implicating a variety of socioeconomic interests. Since the ICESCR does not yet
provide for an individual complaint procedure, the complaint mechanism
under the ICCPR seems to be an attractive alternative for complainants
to pursue their claims before the Committee. This is all the more true
since the Committee has recently taken an even broader interpretation of
its mandate, and has, in the process, opened new grounds for challenging
allegedly discriminatory practices and laws. While the Committee originally only dealt with clear-cut cases of gender discrimination in socioeconomic matters, it has now indicated that it is willing to apply Article
26 to other types of discriminatory distinctions. This change of course
will likely prompt complainants to use the equal protection clause as a
vehicle to enforce social and economic rights more generally, as evinced
by recent disputes to come before the Committee.
A. Application to Economic Issues
A recent dispute reviewed by the Committee, Haraldsson and Sveinsson v. Iceland,29 illustrates the new areas of application of the universal
nondiscrimination clause of ICCPR Article 26. In Haraldsson, the
Committee dealt with the Fisheries Management System in Iceland and
the question of whether giving preferential treatment to existing fishing
licenses violated new license applicants’ equal protection rights.30 In response to overfishing, Iceland adopted an Act in 1985 requiring a fishing
permit for several species of fish.31 The Act gave preferential treatment
to those vessels that had received permits in the previous three years:
only those ships were entitled to fishing quotas on the basis of their catch

27. See Tufyal Choudhury, The Drafting of Article 26 of the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, 2002 EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 591 (2002). For the early
discussion in the Committee regarding these matters, see Bertrand G. Ramcharan, Equality
and Nondiscrimination, in THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS: THE COVENANT ON CIVIL
AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 246, 246–69 (Louis Henkin ed., 1981).
28. Zwaan-de Vries v. Netherlands, supra note 5, at 168, para. 12.3.
29. Haraldsson and Sveinsson, supra note 8.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 4.
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performance during the reference period.32 A new permit was only to be
granted if a vessel already in the fleet was decommissioned. However,
because the quota share of a vessel was transferrable, accession to the
regulated fishing market, at least in practice, depended on the purchase
or lease of such a quota on the free market.33
Market prices for quotas rose considerably and the complainants in this
case, having purchased a ship without an attached quota, faced bankruptcy from the entitlement leasing expense.34 They denounced the system
and started fishing without catch entitlements in order to challenge the
Act’s validity.35 As a result, the complainants were fined, and this sentence was confirmed by the Supreme Court of Iceland.36 Shortly thereafter
the complainants declared bankruptcy and faced considerable financial
hardship in the subsequent months.37
The authors of the communication claimed that the quota discriminated
against new fishers, who had to pay money in order to take part in the
fishing of regulated species, and further denied the fishers the opportunity to pursue the occupation of their choice in accordance with “the principles of freedom of employment and equality . . . .”38 Iceland contested
these claims, pointing out that freedom of employment is not protected
by the ICCPR.39 According to Iceland, there was also no impermissible
discrimination in violation of Article 26, because the fisheries management system sought to prevent over-fishing and to protect the vital public
interest of the State.40
One might assume that this case, which was effectively concerned with
economic matters, would be dealt with under the “freedom of work” doctrine.41 In jurisdictions that provide this right via their constitution, this is
32. Lög um stjórn fiskveiða 19861987 [Act 97/1985] (Stjórnartíðindi A-Deild,
1985, 32327) (Ice.).
33. Haraldsson and Sveinsson, supra note 8, at 6, para. 2.8. The Act, however, stated
that the fishing banks around Iceland were the common property of the nation and that
the quotas to the ships would not give rise to rights of private ownership. Id.
34. Id. at 6, para. 3.1.
35. Id. at 6–7, paras. 3.2–3.3.
36. Id. at 7, para. 3.4.
37. Id. at 7, para. 3.5.
38. Id. at 7, para. 4.1.
39. Id. at 9, para. 5.6.
40. Id. at 9, para. 5.7.
41. See David P. Currie, Lochner Abroad: Substantive Due Process and Equal Protection in the Federal Republic of Germany, 1989 SUP CT. REV. 333, 347, n. 110 (1989),
reprinted in 9 GERMAN L.J. 2179, 2194, n. 110 (2008) (describing the basis of the doctrine in German law to be the belief that one’s vocation “is the foundation of a person’s

10

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 35:1

primarily a matter of access to, and the practice of, a profession.42
However, in the absence of a complaint procedure under the ICESCR,
the challenge was brought under the Optional Protocol of the ICCPR.43
B. The Sweeping Interpretation of the Nondiscrimination Grounds
The Committee, in its analysis under Article 26, reiterated its prior interpretation that discrimination does not only apply to exclusions and
restrictions, but also to preferences.44 The differentiation between fishers
in business during the statutory reference period and fishers who had to
purchase or lease quota shares from the first group was considered to be
a distinction which “is based on grounds equivalent to those of property.”45
In order to satisfy Article 26, such a distinction must be objective and
reasonable according to the standing jurisprudence of the Committee.46
Though the aim of protecting fish stocks was considered legitimate, the
measure of granting quotas on a permanent basis was not deemed
reasonable by the majority of the Committee.47 They preferred a system
in which quotas no longer in use would revert to the State for allocation
to new holders in accordance with standards of fairness and equity.48
Though the Icelandic statutory regime raises questions about its
inherent fairness, it is more questionable whether it qualifies as an unlawful discriminatory State action. The Committee’s line of reasoning,
however, is based on a broad scope of nondiscrimination protection and
establishes a high level of justification under Article 26. In short, the
Committee considerably extended the grounds of nondiscrimination. At
issue was the distinction between those taking part in fishing during the
reference period and new fishers. The Committee asserted that this statutory distinction was equivalent to a distinction based on property,49 but,
in effect, the distinction was not based on property, or anything of the
sort. Properly understood, the distinction turns on the extent of fishing
existence through which that person simultaneously contributes to the total social product.”).
42. See, e.g., Grundgesetz fur die Bundesrepublik Deutschland [GG] (Basic Law)
May 23, 1949, Bundesgesetzblatt, Teil I (BGBI. I), as amended, § 2034, art. 12.
43. Id. at 3. Since there is no right to freedom of work in the Civil and Political
Covenant, the case could only be dealt with under Article 26.
44. General Comment No. 18, supra note 6, ¶ 7.
45. Haraldsson and Sveinsson, supra note 8, para. 10.3.
46. See, e.g., Zwaan-de Vries v. Netherlands, supra note 5, at 167–69 paras. 12–15.
47. Haraldsson and Sveinsson, supra note 8, para. 10.4.
48. Id.
49. According to Yuji Iwasawa, in his dissenting opinion in the Haraldsson matter,
the case involved none of the explicitly-listed grounds of prohibited discrimination. Id. at
25–26.
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conducted in a given reference period. This is a purely factual distinction
relating to actions taken. It is true that the statute allowed established
fishers to accrue an economic asset (the right to partake in fishing), but
this was merely a side effect of the regulation, not the result of any discriminatory distinction. By the time the complainants entered the market,
most of their competitors had already purchased their quotas as well. The
real problem in this case is not the distinction among competitors but the
permanent distribution of quotas. This is not a matter of discrimination
on the basis of property (or anything equivalent) but a matter of access to
the profession. Such a dispute should be dealt with under Article 6 of the
ICESCR. It seems that the Committee circumvented the ICCPR’s lack of
such a provision by resorting to the nondiscrimination clause.
There is another argument that cautions against such an extensive reading of Article 26. If discrimination on the basis of property is interpreted
to prohibit de facto discrimination on the basis of economic assets, there
may hardly be any socioeconomic regulation immune to challenge. Such
loose interpretation goes far beyond that which appeared in earlier
Committee recommendations. For instance, in Zwaan de Fries v. the
Netherlands50 and Broeks v. the Netherlands,51 the Committee discussed
the prohibition of gender discrimination in unemployment law, and explained that Article 26 went beyond Article 2, in that it was also applicable to rights not guaranteed by the ICCPR.52 However, these were cases
involving de jure instances of gender discrimination. Once it was determined that Article 26 was applicable, it was undeniable that there had
been an impermissible discrimination on the grounds of sex, because the
laws themselves were based on gender stereotypes.
In Haraldsson and Sveinsson v. Iceland, on the other hand, the Committee substantially broadened the scope of challengeable discriminatory
distinctions in ruling for the complainants. After all, it is one thing to use
an expansive reading of the covenant to forbid racial and gender discrimination in areas of life that are not explicitly protected,53 but it is quite
another to read the grounds for discrimination so broadly as to equate
50. Zwaan-de Vries v. Netherlands, supra note 5.
51. Broeks v. Netherlands (Communication No. 172/1984), U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm.,
Report of the Human Rights Committee, at 139, U.N. Doc. A/42/40 (Jan. 1, 1987)
[hereinafter Broeks v. Netherlands].
52. Zwaan-de Vries v. Netherlands, supra note 5, at 149, para. 12.3; Broeks v. Netherlands, supra note 51, at 149, para. 12.3.
53. This was the view taken by the Committee in Broeks and Zwaan-de Vries.
Zwaan-de Vries v. Netherlands, supra note 5; Broeks v. Netherlands, supra note 51. See
also General Comment No. 18, supra note 6, ¶ 12.
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almost all imaginable distinctions with those listed explicitly in Article
26. Therein lies the crucial difference between Zwaan de Fries and Haraldsson. Whereas Zwaan de Fries only scrutinized those socioeconomic
regulations that discriminated between men and women,54 Haraldsson
essentially opened the door to challenges for a much wider array of
socioeconomic regulations—whenever a potential complainant can claim
membership to some sort of identifiable group—and this is problematic.55
The trouble with the Committee’s interpretation is not the application
of the nondiscrimination principle to non-Conventional rights, but,
rather, the seemingly unlimited extension of impermissible grounds.56
Properly viewed, however, the Committee’s interpretation was part of a
broader jurisprudential development established in earlier cases, which
indicated a gradual extension of the scope of nondiscrimination. Those
prior decisions resorted to the term “other status,” and thereby extended
the grounds of nondiscrimination under Article 26 beyond those explicitly
mentioned in the Convention.57 In Gueye et al. v. France,58 the Committee held that differentiation by reference to “nationality acquired upon
independence” falls within the parameters of “other status.”59 The Committee has also dealt with discrimination based on marital status, which it
considered a protected class similar to those enumerated in Article 26.60
However, the instances in which the Committee considered such distinctions unreasonable were limited.61 Distinctions such as those between
54. Zwaan-de Vries v. Netherlands, supra note 5, at 160, para. 2.1.
55. After all, socioeconomic legislation is necessarily based on distinctions when it
seeks to address social costs or benefits affecting specific groups. See Gianluigi Palombella, The Abuse of Rights and the Rule of Law, in ABUSE: THE DARK SIDE OF
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 5, 12 (András Sajó ed., 2006). Thus, if Article 26 were to apply to
virtually all distinctions arising under the law, then there would hardly be any area of law
that could avoid a test for reasonableness.
56. But see Ando, supra note 3; Tomuschat, supra note 3.
57. See cases cited supra note 6.
58. Gueye v. France (Communication No. 196/1985), reprinted in U.N. Hum. Rts.
Comm., Report of the Human Rights Committee, at 189, U.N. Doc. A/44/40 (Sept. 29,
1989).
59. Id. at ¶ 9.4. In Guyel, the Committee considered the different treatment of Senegalese as compared to French citizens with respect to military pensions. Id. This, however, cannot be read as a general mandate to treat aliens and nationals equally in the context
of social-security. Distinctions between citizens and aliens are permissible if based on
reasonable and objective criteria. U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., Report of the Human Rights
Committee: General Comment No. 15, ¶ 17, U.N. Doc. A/41/40 (Apr. 11, 1986).
60. See NOWAK, supra note 3, at 625.
61. See e.g., Danning v. Netherlands (Communication No. 180/1984), reprinted in
U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., Report of the Human Rights Committee, at 151, para. 14, U.N.
Doc. A/42/40 (Jan. 1, 1987) [hereinafter Danning v. Netherlands]; Sprenger v. Nether-
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employed and unemployed persons, between graduates and others, between persons sharing a household with their parents and others, as well
as between police officers and volunteer firemen, were found to be
reasonable and objective.62 The significance of this jurisprudence was
rather limited, not only because these cases involved unique fact patterns,
but also because of the lenient level of scrutiny applied, which regularly
upheld legislative distinctions. The interpretation of equal protection in
Haraldsson and Sveinsson v. Iceland, on the other hand, was quite novel.
There, the Committee demanded a high level of justification and
extended the scope of Article 26 to discrimination based on economic
circumstances, thereby clearing the way for a far more inclusive economic
equal protection analysis. Such an extension of the nondiscrimination
grounds moves Article 26 in the direction of a general principle of equality, which requires equal treatment in all contexts and on all grounds.
This is a dubious undertaking that seemingly has no basis in the text of
the Article itself. Though Article 26 provides for equal protection of the
law, it explicitly notes that such protection shall be “without any discrimination.”63 What is meant by “discrimination” is then specified in the
second sentence, which lists “race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other
status.”64 Even though reference is made to “other status,” which opens
the concept of nondiscrimination to new grounds of exclusion, the
enumeration of impermissible grounds, such as race, sex, and social
origin, suggests that it must be comparable to the grounds specified.
It is dubious at best to claim that engagement in fishing during a certain period of time can be compared to such personal characteristics as
race, gender, and religion. In effect, extending the grounds of nondiscrimination to such a vague, almost random, criteria of distinction, which
relates to entirely fact-specific situations and personal behavior, devalues
the other grounds of discrimination. As a consequence, almost all
imaginable groups and activities will fall within the scope of Article 26,
and, thus, any form of statutory distinction could be scrutinized by the
Committee. When it comes to international human rights protection, such
lands (Communication No. 395/1990), reprinted in U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., Report of the
Human Rights Committee, at 311, U.N. Doc. A/47/40 (Jan. 1, 1987) [hereinafter Sprenger v. Netherlands].
62. See NOWAK, supra note 3, at 62627. It is, however, doubtful whether such distinctions fall within the scope of “other status” in the first place.
63. ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 26.
64. ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 26. For a contextual reading of the two sentences, see
NOWAK, supra note 3, at 609.
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a generalized concept of equality goes too far.65 Even when appearing
unreasonable, some distinctions simply cannot be deemed unlawfully
discriminatory.66
C. The Level of Scrutiny
Such a broad interpretation of the nondiscrimination principle is particularly problematic when combined with a high level of scrutiny for the
justification of distinctions. In Haraldsson and Sveinsson v. Iceland, the
Committee held that the State party had not shown that the particular
quota system met the requirements of reasonableness.67 The State argued
that the quota system was necessary to protect sustainable fishing in
Iceland.68 Though the protection of fish stocks was acknowledged as a
legitimate aim, the existence of permanent entitlements rendered the law
unreasonable.69 The application of the reasonableness test in Haraldsson
and Sveinsson v. Iceland shows that the standard for justification is more
demanding than a basic “rational basis” review.70 The Committee engaged in a searching analysis of proportionality in which it asked what
means would be least intrusive while still effective.71 Yet, by favoring a
revertible quota, the majority of members substituted their preferences
for the Icelandic legislature’s and effectively applied a necessity test.
It is startling that the Committee, in just a few sentences, concluded
that the quota fishing system of Iceland was unreasonable. The case involved a complicated matter of economic and environmental regulation
with competing and conflicting public and private interests.72 The legis65. See Michael Stolleis, Historische und ideengeschichtliche Entwicklung des
Gleichheitssatzes, in GLEICHHEIT UND NICHTDISKRIMINIERUNG IM NATIONALEN UND
INTERNATIONALEN MENSCHENRECHTSSCHUTZ 7-22 (Rüdiger Wolfrum ed., 2003).
66. See Alexander Somek, Equality as Reasonableness. Constitutional Normativity in
Demise, in ABUSE: THE DARK SIDE OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 191215 (András Sajó ed.,
2006).
67. Haraldsson and Sveinsson, supra note 8, para. 10.4.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. The United States Supreme Court, in economic matters not involving suspect or
quasi suspect classifications, has applied the arbitrary and capricious test, a low standard
of reasonableness. See, e.g., Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S.
402, 414 (1971).
71. Haraldsson and Sveinsson, supra note 8, para. 10.4.
72. Public interest demanded restrictions on commercial fishing in order to prevent
over-fishing. Id. at para. 5.7. The government enacting the legislation tried to reconcile
the interest in the environment with the interest in a prosperous fishing industry. Id. at
para. 5.8. The goal of the quota system was to manage fisheries in the most sustainable
and efficient manner in order to guarantee profitable and economically efficient utilization of the fish stocks. Id. at para 5.7–8. But with the distribution of quotas, new fishers’
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lature considered not only the public interest in conservation of their natural environment, but also the interest in a vital and sustainable fishing
industry.73 The rights of those taking part in the fishing economy, as well
as those trying to enter the business, also had to be taken into account.74
The divergence of these interests did not render the solution an easy one.
It involved value judgments and prospective decisions. The State party
must have concluded that a different model would jeopardize operating
vessels’ investments (i.e., previously purchased quotas) and would consequently endanger the fishing industry in the future. The Committee, in
open disagreement with the Supreme Court of Iceland, did not accept this
rationale.75
The lack of deference to the careful evaluation of the matter by State
organs is striking. The Icelandic statutory framework had been revised
several times in response to judgments by the Supreme Court of Iceland
in order to accommodate individual rights.76 Finally, the highest court of
Iceland had held the restriction on commercial fishing by the quota system to be compatible with the equal protection clause of the Constitution.77 The court, in explaining its finding, noted that permanent catch
entitlements had made it possible for operators to plan their activities for
the long term.78 It is difficult to see why such a responsible analysis and
revision by the State party should not be considered reasonable. Taking

interests in access to the fishing industry conflicted with the interests of those existing
fishers who had already acquired quotas. Meanwhile the government merely tried to
facilitate long-term planning, id. at para. 5.8, and to create stability for those who had
invested in fishery operations. Id. at para 5.3. The government acknowledged that existing fishers had become dependent on this sector for their livelihoods. Id. at para 5.7. With
the permanent quotas, the government sought to protect those individuals who had direct
interests in the protection of extensive investment in vessel operations, id. at para 5.7,
and, at the same time, the government took action for the sake of the general public interest. Id. at para 2.7.
73. Id. at para. 10.4.
74. See id.
75. Id. at para. 10.4.
76. See id. at 4, para. 2.1.
77. Id. at 6, para. 2.6. According to Iceland’s Constitution:
All shall be equal before the law and enjoy human rights without regard to sex,
religion, opinion, national origin, race, color, financial status, parentage and
other status. . . . Men and women shall enjoy equal rights in every respect.
CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF ICELAND, art. 65, reprinted in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE
COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD 29 (Gisbert H. Flanz ed., Ágúst Árnason trans., 1999).
78. Haraldsson and Sveinsson, supra note 8, para. 2.6.
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into account that the case involved purely economic matters79 without
any kind of invidious discrimination (such as a distinction on the basis of
race or gender), it would have been adequate to defer to the parliament’s
evaluation and to limit judicial review to an arbitrariness standard.80 The
Committee’s mere perception that a statutory regulation was unjust or
inequitable should have been insufficient to render it in violation of the
ICCPR.
D. The Role and Capacities of the Committee
It is not clear whether the consequences of this new kind of equal protection analysis have been fully considered. If Article 26 is continually
interpreted and applied in this fashion, the Committee will soon be confronted with a veritable onslaught of disputes encompassing a vast array
of fact patterns. Such disputes will demand a high degree of competence
in order to be properly evaluated and the Committee will be required to
balance competing concerns to determine whether the high threshold of
reasonableness advocated in Haraldsson and Sveinsson v. Iceland has
been met. Not only will professional and technical competence be necessary, the Committee will also need a deeper understanding of complicated areas of economic and social regulation.81 Such an undertaking
creates an unnecessary and distracting burden on an international human
rights body.
It is true that in the late 1980s the interpretation of Article 26 as a nonaccessory right in Zwaan de Fries attracted similar criticism,82 but that
interpretive leap was clearly justified. The current trend of extending the
meaning of this provision further by moving the nondiscrimination rule
in the direction of a less deferential, general equal protection principle
has a new quality. Previously, the Committee limited its analysis to the
grounds spelled out in Article 26, and, thus, the judicial analysis was restrained by the text of the Convention.83 In Zwaan de Fries v. the Nether79. Arguably, Article 26 was never implicated here, because the statute at issue did
not concern any of the nondiscrimination grounds.
80. See e.g., Des Fours Walderode v. Czech Republic, supra note 5, at 94; Brok and
Brokova v. Czech Republic (Communication No. 774/1997), reprinted in U.N. Hum. Rts.
Comm., Report of the Human Rights Committee, at 110, U.N. Doc. A/57/40 (Jan. 1,
2002) [hereinafter Brok and Brokova v. Czech Republic].
81. Opsahl in 1988 already questioned whether the Committee is competent to
become an effective Ombudsman for Equality in every area covered by legislation.
Opsahl, supra note 22, at 64.
82. See, e.g., Tomuschat, supra note 3, at 227.
83. In P.P.C. v. the Netherlands the Committee explained that art. 26 “does not
extend to differences of results in the application of common rules in the allocation of
benefits.” P.P.C. v. the Netherlands (Communication No. 212/1986), reprinted in, U.N.
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lands, it was clear that the gender discrimination at issue was based on
stereotypes and therefore unreasonable.84 But if a dispute is purely economic (i.e., if it concerns an area of purely socioeconomic issues), and if
the distinction is based on economic facts (e.g, fishing during the reference period in the case of Haraldsson and Sveinsson), the analysis of the
regulation’s reasonableness will involve an assessment of factors that lie
beyond the sphere of human rights standards. There is then a risk that
claimants will use the individual complaint procedure to have a broad
range of legislation reviewed by the Committee on the basis of equal protection. This will lead to an unmanageable load of cases and a reduction
in judicial effectiveness. Furthermore, it is doubtful whether such a
course of action would further the interests in economic, social, and cultural rights. The ICESCR is much better equipped with the expertise to
resolve such issues and will be competent to consider individual communications once the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR enters into force.85
Fortunately, several members of the Committee took nuanced positions
in dissent. Sir Nigel Rodley, for instance, having acknowledged the difficulties a nonexpert international body faces in attempting to master the
issues at stake, called for greater deference to the State party’s determination.86 Yuki Iwasawa also advocated a wider scope of legislative discretion in economic regulation.87 Ruth Wedgwood concurred with
Iwasawa, arguing that the ICCPR is not a “manifesto for economic
deregulation” and that the Committee should remain true to the limits of
its legal and practical competence in order to protect the important rights
covered by the Covenant.88 Elisabeth Palm, Ivan Shearer, and Iulia
Antoanella Motoc, in their dissenting opinions, did not require such
deference.89 Instead, they required distinctions to be “based on objective
ground” and “proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.”90 They
concluded, however, that Iceland had carried out a “careful balance” and
Hum. Rts. Comm., Report of the Human Rights Committee, at 244, ¶ 6.2, U.N. Doc.
A/43/40 (Sept. 28, 1988).
84. The Netherlands, by changing the law retroactively, seemed to acknowledge that
the differentiation involved gender discrimination. See Zwaan-de Vries v. Netherlands,
supra note 5, at 162, para. 4.5.
85. Hum. Rts. Comm., Report of the Human Rights Committee, at 4, U.N. Doc.
A/63/435 (Nov. 28, 2008).
86. Haraldsson and Sveinsson, supra note 8, at 24.
87. Id. at 25–26.
88. Id. at 27.
89. Id. at 22.
90. Id. The Committee, however, used the terms “objective” and “reasonable” in
describing the standard they would adhere to. Id. at 19–20, ¶ 10.2.
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met this test.91 This lack of unanimity among the members may indicate
that the Committee will reevaluate and refine its approach to equal protection analysis in the future.
II. LEARNING FROM CONSTITUTIONAL EQUAL PROTECTION
The following section will make some suggestions for the future
conceptualization of international equal protection. In order to develop a
solid and constructive approach, it is necessary to evaluate the underlying
rationales of the equal protection doctrine. With that end in mind, consideration of the evolution of the equal protection principle in the context
of domestic law and its interpretation over time is instructive.92
A. The Focus on Grounds of Nondiscrimination
The equal protection principle, a fundamental feature of modern constitutional law, has many facets and has evolved substantially over the
past two centuries. Equal protection “before the law” was first emphasized as early as the French Revolution.93 It required equal application of
the law and thus became particularly relevant to the administration of
law.94 Later, the Civil War Amendments to the United States Constitution
introduced the principle of equal protection “of the law,” which binds the
legislature, as well as the judiciary and the executive.95 The Fourteenth
Amendment provides that “[n]o state shall . . . deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”96 The earliest interpretation
of this edict was limited to the prohibition of slavery.97 In the nineteenth
century, the concept of comprehensive, substantive equal protection was
not yet developed.98 It was an advent of the twentieth century that

91. Id. at 22.
92. For the relationship between comparative law and international law, see George
A. Bermann, Le droit comparé et le droit international: allis ou ennemis?, 2003 REVUE
INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT COMPARÉ 519 (2003).
93. DÉCLARATION DES DROITS DE L’HOMME ET DU CITOYEN DE 1789, art. 6.
94. See NOWAK, supra note 3, at 598.
95. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
In Germany, the idea of equal protection of the law was first expressed in the text of the
Constitution of the Weimar Republic. See Weimarer Reichsverfassung [Constitution] art.
109 [F.R.G.], reprinted in CONSTITUTIONS THAT MADE HISTORY 379 (Albert P. Blaustein
& Jay A. Sigler eds., 1988).
96. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
97. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 81 (1873).
98. For the historical development of the nondiscrimination doctrine, see, Stolleis,
supra note 65, at 7–122. See also Opsahl, supra note 22; Karl Josef Partsch, Fundamental
Principles of Human Rights: Self-Determination, Equality and Nondiscrimination, in 1
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domestic and international law went beyond procedural protection and
focused on the more specific prohibition of discrimination on the basis of
certain individual characteristics.99
Beginning with the Slaughter-House Cases in 1873, the U.S. Supreme
Court interpreted the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to prohibit racial discrimination.100 Though this was the first
official enunciation of the equality principle, the Court refused to apply
the clause beyond the context of discrimination based on race and
alienage until the 1960s.101 Then, the Court gradually tabulated a list of
quasi-suspect classifications covering such grounds as gender and
illegitimacy.102 More recently, the Court has refused to expand the list
further, reasoning that the Equal Protection Clause could then be used to
expand constitutional rights beyond those explicitly recognized in the
Constitution.103 As Justice Powell explained, “It is not the province of
this Court to create substantive constitutional rights in the name of
guaranteeing equal protection of the laws.”104 In sum, despite its
seemingly broad wording, the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S.
Constitution has never been interpreted by the Supreme Court as providing for general equality. The pursuit of such broader goals has instead
been left to the legislature.105
The insight that equal protection is best expressed by identifying specific grounds of nondiscrimination was also manifested in several other
post-World War II constitutions.106 These examples usually differ from
the open-ended text of the French and U.S. Constitutions.107 Though they
THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS, 61, 72 (Karel Vasak & Philip Alston eds., 1982).
99. Partsch, supra note 98, at 73.
100. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 81.
101. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 590 (1964). In Toyosaburo Korematsu v. United
States, the Supreme Court explained that discrimination on the basis of race and alienage
is immediately suspect. Toyosaburo Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216
(1944).
102. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 767 (1977); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190
(1976); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
103. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33 (1973).
104. Id.
105. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (1966); Voting Rights Act
of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1966); Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (1970).
106. Edward J. Eberle, German Equal Protection: Substantive Review of Economic
Measures, 9 GERMAN L.J. 2095, 2099 (2008).
107. For ready access to constitutional law worldwide, see CONSTITUTIONS OF THE
COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD: A SERIES OF UPDATED TEXTS, CONSTITUTIONAL
CHRONOLOGIES AND ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHIES (Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H.
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also provide for equal protection of the law, they tend to include nondiscrimination clauses that define equal protection by spelling out
impermissible grounds of nondiscrimination.108 The Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms, for example, mentions race, national or ethnic
origin, color, religion, sex, age, and mental or physical disability.109 The
South African Constitution contains a more elaborate catalog.110 Apart
from the traditional nondiscrimination grounds, such as race, color,
ethnicity, alienage, and gender, it outlaws discrimination on the basis of
wealth, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language,
birth, sexual orientation, pregnancy, marital status, and social origin.111
In both jurisdictions, constitutional equal protection review is not a matter of general equality but of invidious discrimination.112 According to
the Supreme Court of Canada, “[E]quality means that our society cannot
tolerate legislative distinctions that treat certain people as second-class
citizens, that demean them, that treat them as less capable for no good

Flanz eds., 1971). See also, Andreas Kellerhals & Dirk Trüten, Equality under Swiss
Law, 1999 ST. LOUIS-WARSAW TRANSATLANTIC L.J. 37, 3753 (1999).
108. The United Kingdom’s Canadian Act, for example, provides for equal protection
before and under the law, as well as for equal protection and benefit of the law without
discrimination, while also spelling out specific grounds of nondiscrimination. Canada
Act, 1982, c.11, § 15.1, sched. B (Eng.). For other examples of constitutional protection
of equal protection with specific prohibitions, see The Instrument of Government [Constitution] arts. 15 and 16 (Swed.), reprinted in 17 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF
THE WORLD 7 (Rüdiger Wolfrum et al. eds., 2005); Constitution of the Republic of
Finland, § 6, reprinted in, CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD 2 (Rüdiger
Wolfrum et al. eds., 2006); Constitution of the Russian Federation, art. 19, reprinted in,
CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD 4 (Gisbert H. Flanz ed., 2002); Constitution of the Italian Republic, art. 3, reprinted in, CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF
THE WORLD 1 (Rüdiger Wolfrum et al. eds., 2006); Constitution of the Kingdom of
Spain, art. 14, reprinted in, CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD 12 (Gisbert
H. Flanz ed., 2004).
109. Canda Act, 1982, c.11, § 15.1, sched. B (Eng.). According to the Supreme Court
of Canada these categories are neither exclusive or exhaustive, but merely representative.
Egan v. Canada, [1995] S.C.R. 513 (Can.).The Court, therefore, extended protection to
same-sex partners.
110. Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, ch. 2, § 9, reprinted in,
CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD 12 (Gisbert H. Flanz & Patricie H.
Ward eds., 2004).
111. Id. For an overview of constitutional equal protection in South Africa, see
Lourens W.H. Ackermann, Equality under the 1996 South African Constitution, in
GLEICHHEIT UND NICHTDISKRIMINIERUNG IM NATIONALEN UND INTERNATIONALEN
MENSCHENRECHTSSCHUTZ 10517 (Rüdiger Wolfrum ed., 2003).
112. See, e.g., Law v. Canada, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497 (Can.); Prinsloo v. van der Linde
1997 (6) BCLR 759 (CC) at paras. 31–33 (S. Afr.).
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reason, or that otherwise offend fundamental human dignity.”113 The
South African Constitutional Court also gives special attention to specific
grounds of nondiscrimination and has interpreted the general equal protection clause narrowly.114
B. Equality as a Measure to Probe Legislation?
There have been efforts in a few jurisdictions to go beyond textual
nondiscrimination distinctions and test legislation under general principles of equality, but those efforts have been challenged.115 One example comes from the German constitution, the German Basic Law, which
provides both a general principle of equality clause in Article 3(1) and a
nondiscrimination clause in Article 3(3).116 In practice, the latter plays a
less significant role due to the fact that constitutional adjudicators are
mainly concerned with the general equality principle.117 In that sense,
equal protection has become a structural principle for the organization of
government, and is utilized primarily to limit the government’s discretionary power.118 With this emphasis, German equal protection analysis differs from that of many other jurisdictions that focus on specified grounds
of discrimination.119 Nonetheless, it should be noted that German courts
do not apply a uniform standard of review for all inequalities.120 The
level of scrutiny varies depending on the subject matter concerned and
the distinction upon which unequal treatment is based.121 The German
113. Egan v. Canada, [1995] S.C.R. 513, at ¶ 36.
114. The South African Constitutional Court only requires a rational connection to a
legitimate government purpose for differentiations under section 9(1). Prinsloo v. van der
Linde 1997 (6) BCLR 759 (CC) at paras. 31–33; Harksen v. Lane 1997 (11) BCLR 1489
(CC) (S. Afr.).
115. See, e.g., Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972); Christian Starck, Commentary
on Article 3, in 1 DAS BONNER GRUNDGESETZ 310 (Hermann von Mangoldt, et al. eds.,
1999); see also Wojciech Sadurski, Perspectives on Equal Protection (pt. 1), 1998
ST.LOUIS-WARSAW TRANSATLANTIC L.J. 63, 71 (noting that the prospect of treating
everyone equally is “an impossible and unattractive ideal”).
116. Grundgesetz fur die Bundesrepublik Deutschland [GG] (Basic Law) May 23,
1949, Bundesgesetzblatt, Teil I (BGBI.I), as amended, § 2034, art 3. See generally
Susanne Baer, Equality: The Jurisprudence of the German Constitutional Court, 5
COLUM. J. EUR. L. 249, 277–279 (1999); Michael Sachs, The Equality Rule Before the
German Federal Constitutional Court, 1998 ST. LOUIS-WARSAW TRANSATLANTIC L.J.
139.
117. Baer, supra note 116, at 251.
118. Sachs, supra note 116, at 148.
119. Baer, supra note 116, at 260.
120. Sachs, supra note 116, at 139.
121. Baer, supra note 116, at 258; Sachs, supra note 116, at 141.
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Federal Constitutional Court applies a high level of scrutiny only with
respect to distinctions implicating fundamental rights and distinctions
based on grounds sufficiently similar to those specified in Article 3(3),
such as race, sex, gender, language, national origin, disability, faith,
religion, and political opinion.122 Other types of distinctions are
evaluated for arbitrariness.123 Though German jurisprudence does not
formally distinguish between different classifications, such as suspect
classification and quasi-suspect classification, the courts’ analyses vary
depending on the nature of the distinction involved and its potential implications.124 Compared to the United States’ jurisprudence, the analysis
of the German Constitutional Court is generally more probing, but the
standard of review applied in individual cases depends nonetheless on
the distinction made.125 In this sense there are parallels between these
jurisdictions, as will be further addressed below.126
Suffice it to say that the concept of equal protection has not remained
fixed throughout its history. Equal protection of the law, as a matter of
substantive equality, has raised many difficulties, as the principle of
equality itself is intrinsically vague and therefore requires specification.127 Most courts have tried to give meaning to this general principle
by focusing on the concept of nondiscrimination, and this is true even in
jurisdictions where the text of the constitutional equal protection clause

122. Over a period of 30 years, Article 3 has been interpreted as a prohibition of
arbitrariness in legislation, a rather lenient standard of judicial review.
Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Oct. 23, 1951, 1
Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 14 (52) (F.R.G.). The socalled “new formula,” a more demanding standard of review, is a more recent jurisprudential development, which is still highly controversial. See Bundesverfassungsgericht
[BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Oct. 7, 1980, 55 Entscheidungen des
Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 72 (88) (F.R.G.); Bundesverfassungsgericht
[BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Apr. 4, 2001, 103 Entscheidungen des
Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 310 (318) (F.R.G.). See also Hans Meyer,
Gleichheit und Nichtdiskriminierung — die deutsche Debatte, in GLEICHHEIT UND
NICHTDISKRIMINIERUNG IM NATIONALEN UND INTERNATIONALEN MENSCHENRECHTSSCHUTZ 79–93 (Rüdiger Wolfrum ed., 2003). For the interpretation of equal protection by
the French Conseil Constitutionnel, see Olivier Jouanjan, Gleichheitssatz und NichtDiskriminierung in Frankreich, in GLEICHHEIT UND NICHTDISKRIMINIERUNG IM
NATIONALEN UND INTERNATIONALEN MENSCHENRECHTSSCHUTZ 59–78 (Rüdiger Wolfrum
ed., 2003).
123. The German test of arbitrariness is more demanding than basic rationality review
in the United States. See, Eberle, supra note 106, at 2100 (2008).
124. Sachs, supra note 116, at 153.
125. Eberle, supra note 106, at 2100.
126. See infra Part III.C.2.
127. Sadurski, supra note 115, at 7172.
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is open-ended, such as the United States.128 The interpretation of such
general clauses reveals a focus on specific types of distinctions, requiring
higher standards of justification.129 A general equal protection analysis
going beyond these nondiscrimination grounds is rather exceptional in
constitutional review.130 It is very controversial; thus, it is far from
representing a universal consensus.131 If exercised at all, such an
approach usually applies different standards of review depending on the
nature of the discrimination at issue.132
C. The Transfer to International Equal Protection
Given the historical development of equal protection norms in domestic law, it should come as no surprise that the equality principle has also
been codified as a nondiscrimination principle on the international
level.133 The ICCPR, for instance, incorporated both the principle of
equality “before the law” and equality “of the law.”134 However, language within the ICCPR indicates that its drafters never meant to provide
for general quality with respect to all socioeconomic legislation—the
ICCPR explicitly states that equal protection “of the law” merely protects
against discrimination on specified grounds.135 In this sense, Article 26 of
the ICCPR exhibits several parallels to modern equal protection provisions, and the grounds listed in Article 26 seem to reflect an international
consensus with respect to impermissible grounds for discrimination.136
Consistent with this wording, the early jurisprudence on Article 26
focused on the nondiscrimination clause as a clarification of equal
protection.137 However, by extending its application in later reports, the
Committee has moved it in the direction of a general equality principle.138 The nondiscrimination principle, which was introduced in order
128. See sources cited supra note 107.
129. Partsch, supra note 98, at 73.
130. Id. at 69.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 73.
133. See WARWICK MCKEAN, EQUALITY AND DISCRIMINATION UNDER INTERNATIONAL
LAW (1983).
134. But see Tomuschat, supra note 3, at 227 (suggesting that Article 26 merely
applies to enacted laws).
135. The first sentence of Article 26 explicitly refers to the right to equal protection of
the law “without any discrimination.” ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 26. The second sentence
identifies specific grounds of discrimination which are impermissible. Id.
136. See NOWAK, supra note 3, at 598; see also Part II.A.
137. See cases cited supra note 6.
138. See analysis of Haraldsson Case at supra Part I.B.
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to clarify the equal protection principle, thereby stands to lose its essential contours and meaning. Given the historical trajectory from equality
“before the law,” to equality “of the law,” to the nondiscrimination principle, this shift toward an open-ended notion of equality seems almost
anachronistic. At the very least, it is unparalleled in the world of constitutional law due to its generality and breadth.
It is important to remember that the ICCPR is an international human
rights instrument concerned with the protection of fundamental rights.139
It sets universal standards that its Member States are required to guarantee at a very minimum.140 In the interpretation of these standards, the
Committee should not lose sight of comparative constitutional law. The
legal practice of several democratic states has also guided the European
Court of Human Rights in its analysis of the nondiscrimination principle
of Article 14 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.141 This is not to advocate a least
common denominator approach to international law, but to encourage the
consideration of the profound legal discourse that has occurred regarding
similar matters of domestic law. At least in the area of equal protection,
it is not the prerogative of the Human Rights Committee or the regional
courts of human rights to expand their interpretations beyond the views
shared within comparative constitutional law without a firm legal
basis.142
Yet another argument cautioning against such a sweeping interpretation is that the rise of equal protection of the law has far-reaching structural implications with respect to nation-state governments and separation of powers. The dialogue surrounding constitutional equal protection
has long been preoccupied with the tension between democracy and constitutionalism.143 However, with judicial review moving in the direction
of a general principle, equality of the law is evolving into more of a tool
for the judiciary, rather than a matter for democratically-elected legislatures. In short, legislative determinations are increasingly subjected to
judicial scrutiny in order to ascertain whether they adequately provide for

139. ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 5.
140. ICCPR, supra note 3, preamble.
141. See, e.g., Case “Relating to Certain Aspects of the Laws on the Use of Languages
in Education in Belgium” v. Belgium (No. 2), 6 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) at 30–31 (1968).
142. For a comprehensive overview of equal protection in domestic and international
law, see GLEICHHEIT UND NICHTDISKRIMINIERUNG IM NATIONALEN UND INTERNATIONALEN
MENSCHENRECHTSSCHUTZ (Rüdiger Wolfrum ed., 2003).
143. See, e.g,. MARK V. TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE
COURTS 60–61 (1991); Stephen M. Griffi, Judicial Supremacy and Equal Protection In a
Democracy of Rights, 4 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 281.
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substantive equality. This adjudicatory second-guessing could cause a
chilling effect on socioeconomic legislation, which would be counterproductive to the societal goals of enhancing social and economic
wealth. This approach is already questionable on the domestic level, and
it is definitely not embraced by all states.144
Furthermore, international institutions, such as the European Court of
Human Rights and the Human Rights Committee, are not in a competent
position to comprehensively reassess democratic decisions regarding
economic and social issues.145 It is one thing to evaluate a law as to
whether it constitutes racial, sexual, or otherwise suspect discrimination,
but it is quite another thing to demand that all distinctions arising from
legislation meet vague standards of general equality and pass the substantial hurdles of review in accordance with reasonable and objective
criteria. The question of what is reasonable and fair is context-specific;
thus, it is unlikely that the standard of fairness is homogenous enough to
qualify as a universal principle, and it is even less likely that it could
qualify as a human rights principle. In other words, to clothe purely
economic inequalities as an issue of human rights raises serious concerns
over the dilution of the human rights ideal. Therefore, international judicial bodies should be confident in exercising more judicial self-restraint,
not only in the face of their already overwhelming case loads, but also as
a matter of democracy. International human rights bodies should not
blithely interfere with, or substitute their analyses of socioeconomic legislation for, that of democratically elected legislators and competent constitutional adjudicators, particularly in disputes that have been carefully
scrutinized by responsible domestic institutions.
III. SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE INTERNATIONAL EQUAL PROTECTION
ANALYSIS
As the foregoing discussion has shown, the Committee’s current reading of the equal protection clause of the ICCPR does not reflect broad
consensus, and a focus on nondiscrimination would be preferable. The
analysis of the Committee’s interpretation demonstrates that the basic
problems arise with the proper reading of the grounds of discrimination
and in the definition of reasonableness. These elements, therefore, are the
focus of the following discussion. Drawing on domestic jurisprudence, I
will make suggestions for a future conceptualization of international

144. Partsch, supra note 98, at 69.
145. See Haraldsson and Sveinsson, supra note 8, at 25–26.
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equal protection, and I will consider ways to integrate early Committee
recommendations into a coherent equal protection doctrine.
A. Focus on Nondiscrimination Analysis
One step to adequately deal with nondiscrimination cases in the future
would be to focus on the grounds of discrimination explicitly
delineated146 and to develop a differentiated doctrinal framework along
these lines. According to settled Human Rights Committee doctrine,
Article 26 of the ICCPR is applicable to any field regulated and protected
by public authorities; however, this does not mean that it provides for a
principle of general equality.147 Equality “of the law,” pursuant to Article
26, merely prohibits discrimination on the bases listed in the second
clause.148
It is therefore incumbent upon the Committee to further specify the
grounds of nondiscrimination that will be entertained as potential violations of Article 26. If an excessively broad interpretation of those
grounds is not avoided, nearly any distinction could be characterized as
discrimination, and this would result in comprehensive scrutiny of a plethora of legislation for reasonableness.
One example is discrimination based on property. As the Haraldsson
case demonstrates, with a broad reading of the term “property,” almost
every piece of economic regulation could be considered discriminatory
on the basis that some controlling distinction is equivalent to a distinction based on property.149 If “property” were interpreted to include “all
forms of economic assets,” the Committee would soon have to contend
with the reasonableness of tax laws, which regularly provide for different
levels of regulation depending on an individual’s income and assets.
Subsidies and public procurement laws could also become the subject of
the Committee’s scrutiny. This would be similarly questionable. Of
course, to advocate a stricter reading of Article 26 is not to remove

146. This approach was already advocated by Partsch. Partsch, supra note 98, at 69.
But see Georg Nolte, Gleichheit und Nichtdiskriminierung, in GLEICHHEIT UND
NICHTDISKRIMINIERUNG IM NATIONALEN UND INTERNATIONALEN MENSCHENRECHTSSCHUTZ 235, 237 (Rüdiger Wolfrum ed., 2003).
147. See., e.g., Zwaan-de Vries v. Netherlands, supra note 5, at 168.
148. This is also the approach taken by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.
The Court of Human Rights has interpreted Article 24 of the American Convention on
Human Rights as referring to the grounds of nondiscrimination in Article 1, paragraph 1.
Exceptions to the Exhaustion of Domestic Remedies (Art. 46(1), 46(2)(a) and 46(2)(b) of
the American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-11/90, Inter-Am Ct
HR (ser A) No. 11 (Aug. 10, 1990), para. 22.
149. Haraldsson and Sveinsson, supra note 8.

2010]

THE RISE OF EQUALITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

27

“property” from lists of explicit discriminatory distinctions, but it would
be sensible for the Committee to focus on such cases in which voting
rights, for example, are afforded discriminately on the basis of property.
Evaluating economic and social regulations comprehensively but without
greater doctrinal focus is beyond the scope of Article 26.
B. The Meaning of “Other Status”
Though the list in Article 26 is not exhaustive, one should be careful in
extending it to remote bases of impermissible discrimination. The reference to discrimination on the basis of “other status” renders the concept
flexible over time, but there is an implicit caveat that overreaching
should be avoided. The term “other status” should not be interpreted so
expansively that it becomes the primary measure of the reasonableness of
legislative acts.150 Instead, this term should be interpreted contextually, in
light of the other grounds explicitly listed.
There is consensus that discrimination based on “race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, and birth” is unacceptable.151 Further, the grounds listed in Article
26 refer to identifiably distinct categories.152 They are personal characteristics that should not be the principal determinants of an individual’s
rights or privileges. Some are immutable, such as race, colour, sex,
origin, and birth, reflecting the idea that individuals are born equal.153
Others follow from an exercise of universally accepted fundamental
rights, such as freedom of religion, the right to own property, and free-

150. See Tomuschat, supra note 3, at 242; Kavanagh v. Ireland (Communication No.
819/1998), reprinted in U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., Report of the Human Rights Committee,
at 122, paras. 10.2–10.3, U.N. Doc. A/56/4 (Oct. 1, 2001). But see, NOWAK, supra note 3,
at 627 (endorsing the Committee’s broad interpretation of “other status” in Kavanah v.
Ireland as “justified”).
151. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294 (1955); Mabo v. Queensland
(1988) 166 C.L.R. 186 (Austl.); Lavoie v. Canada, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 769 (Can.); Case
Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Rwanda), 2002 I.C.J. 219 (July 10).
152. B.d.B. et al. v. Netherlands (Communication No. 273/1988, adopted 1989), reprinted in U.N. Hum. Rts.Comm., Report of the Human Rights Committee, at 286, para.
6.7, U.N. Doc. A/44/40 (Sept. 29, 1989).
153. Tomuschat, supra note 3, at 232 (referring to these characteristics as “stable
characteristics”). However, Sadurski argues that “immutability” is not an adequate or
appropriate touchstone for determining the existence of impermissible classifications.
Sadurski, supra note 115, at 78–84. Instead, he advocates focusing on the wrongful
motives of prejudice and hostility in discerning whether legislative enactments are discriminatory. Id. at 93–102.
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dom of expression (political or otherwise). Distinctions based on these
traits are intolerable because they seriously jeopardize the fundamental
concept of human rights154—the conviction that individuals are born
equal with inalienable rights.155 This conviction is called into question
when a governmental body distinguishes citizens on one of these bases.
This understanding of nondiscrimination is reflected in the jurisprudence
of several constitutional courts. As the South African Constitutional
Court in Prinsloo v. Van der Linde156 explained, unfair discrimination
means essentially “treating persons differently in a way which impairs
their fundamental dignity as human beings.”157 A similar approach was
adopted by the Supreme Court of Canada in the matter of Law v. Canada.158 There, the Court explained that the purpose of the equality rights
provision of the Canadian Charter is “to prevent the violation of essential
human dignity and freedom through the imposition of disadvantage, stereotyping, or political or social prejudice.”159
It is not only the area of application that triggers equal protection
analysis, but also the particular nature of the distinction and the criteria
used in the implementation thereof. In other words, fundamental rights
are not only implicated where there is unequal treatment with respect to
the specified areas protected by the Covenant, but also if there is discrimination in other fields of law on the basis of, for example, race, religion,
opinion, or sex. Therefore, a high standard of scrutiny should be exercised in reviewing the following types of legislation: (1) legislation under
which distinguishable groups do not enjoy the same fundamental rights
(e.g., voting rights); and (2) legislation under which a specific type of
discrimination, such as racial discrimination, is so invidious that it cannot
be tolerated regardless of the exact context in which the distinction is
made. For instance, where public benefits are distributed on the basis of
race, the basic human right of equal dignity before the law is subverted.
A high burden of justification ought to be demanded from any legislature
willing to pass such a measure.
154. Choudhury, supra note 3, at 41.
155. See VA. CONST. of 1776, § 1, reprinted in, 7 THE FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONS: COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES,
TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES NOW OR HERETOFORE FORMING THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 382 (Francis N. Thorpe ed., 1909) (“That all men are by nature equally free and
independent, and have certain inherent rights.”); DÉCLARATION DES DROITS DE L’HOMME
ET DU CITOYEN DE 1789, art. 1, (“Les hommes naissent et demeurent libres et égaux en
droits.” [Men are born and remain free and equal in rights.]).
156. Prinsloo v. van der Linde 1997 (6) BCLR 759 (CC) (S. Afr.).
157. Id. at para. 33.
158. Law v. Canada, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497.
159. Id. at 516.
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The distinctions listed in Article 26 make up significant elements of
personal identity;160 however, other grounds of discrimination, such as
sexual orientation,161 age,162 and disability,163 should be similarly protected as immutable personal characteristics.164 Still, it is unclear whether
additional characteristics, particularly those linked to personal decisions
of free will, should be included in this list.165 One example is marital
status. That married couples enjoy preferential treatment such as tax benefits is unlikely to be deemed a human rights issue. Marital status is not
an invidious distinction because there are a number of legitimate reasons
for legislatures to afford certain types of benefits to married couples but
not to single individuals. These reasons include the State’s interest in
family welfare, as well as the lack of impact on unmarried individuals’
fundamental rights (provided they do not wish to marry).
C. Refining the Standard of Reasonableness
If a legislature wishes to cast distinctions on the basis of any of the
explicitly enumerated grounds or on a sufficiently analogous basis, the
distinction must then be justified. As the Committee has explained repeatedly, there is no absolute prohibition on legislation that treats certain
groups differently from others.166 Rather, it is only those distinctions that
160. In other words, it is not only immutability or prejudice and hostility which might
explain the classifications listed in Article 26. See Sadurski, supra note 115, at 78–84
(critiquing the use of “immutability” alone as a measure of discrimination).
161. The Committee has found that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is
a form of sexual discrimination, and thus contrary to articles 2, paragraph 1, and 26 of the
Covenant. Toonen v. Australia, (Communication No. 488/1992), reprinted in Hum. Rts.
Comm., Report of the Human Rights Committee, at 235, U.N. Doc. A/49/40 (Sept. 21,
1994). But see, NOWAK, supra note 3, at 623 (favoring the inclusion of sexual orientation
with the definition of “other status”). Another good reason to consider sexual orientation
as an “other status” is that it goes to the heart of the right to privacy.
162. Love v. Australia (Communication No. 983/2001) at 14, ¶ 8.2, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/77/D/983/2001 (Apr. 28, 2003) (noting that age discrimination is generally impermissible; however, it may be justified if “based on reasonable and objective criteria”).
163. C v. Australia (Communication No. 832/1998), reprinted in, U.N. Hum. Rts.
Comm., Report of the Human Rights Committee, at 260, U.N. Doc. No. A/56/40 (Jan. 10,
2001).
164. The South African Constitutional Court refers to “fundamental dignity” of human
beings in its equal protection analysis. Prinsloo v. van der Linde 1997 (6) BCLR 759
(CC) at para. 31 (S. Afr.); see also Ackermann, supra note 111, at 112.
165. But see, Danning v. Netherlands, supra note 61 at 151, para. 14; Sprenger v. the
Netherlands, supra note 64, at 308.
166. Zwaan-de Vries v. Netherlands, supra note 5, at 168, para. 13; Broeks v. Netherlands, supra note 51, at 150, para. 13.
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are neither objective nor reasonable that are to be deemed impermissible.167 Still, the standard of reasonableness is inherently vague and
neither the Human Rights Committee’s General Comment on Nondiscrimination nor the relevant case law defines the term “reasonable.”168
Given the recently expanded scope of application of the principle of
nondiscrimination in the Committee’s jurisprudence, it is necessary to
specify what is meant by “reasonableness.” Of course, crafting a definition of the term may be easier said than done, and the substantial
number of dissenting opinions in recent cases indicates that there is a
controversy among the Committee with respect to the meaning of—and
the standards for determining—reasonableness.169
1. Different Levels of Scrutiny
The “reasonable and objective” criterion is also to be found in domestic
constitutional equal protection jurisprudence170 and in the case law of the
European Court of Human Rights.171 Generally speaking, what is “reasonable” can only be determined by comparing the competing interests at
stake in a given dispute. This involves a balancing inquiry; the adjudicator evaluates the legislative aim in relation to its consequences with the
goal of striking a certain degree of proportionality between the two. In
the Case “Relating to Certain Aspects of the Laws on the Use of
Languages in Education in Belgium,”172 the European Court of Human
Rights explained that “[t]he existence of . . . a justification must be
assessed in relation to the aim and effects of the measure under consideration.”173 Therefore, the Court requires a legitimate aim and a “reasona-

167. Zwaan-de Vries v. Netherlands, supra note 5, at 168, para. 13; Broeks v. Netherlands, supra note 51, at 150, para. 13.
168. General Comment No. 18, supra note 6, ¶ 13.
169. See, e.g., Brok and Brokova v. Czech Republic, supra note 80 at 110; Diergaardt
v. Namibia (Communication No. 760/1997), reprinted in U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm. Report
of the Human Rights Committee, at 140, U.N. Doc. No. A/55/40 (Feb. 1, 2001). See also
Ando, supra note 3, at 220.
170. The proportionality analysis is found, for example, in Germany, France, and Poland. See Guy Carcassonne, The Principle of Equality in France, 1998 ST. LOUISWARSAW TRANSATLANTIC L.J. 159, 159–72; Leszek Lech Garlicki, The Principle of
Equality and the Prohibition of Discrimination in the Jurisprudence of the Constitutional
Tribunal of Poland, 1999 ST. LOUIS-WARSAW TRANSATLANTIC L.J. 1, 7 (1999); Jouanjan,
supra note 127, at 5978.
171. See CC decision no. 2000-437DC, Dec. 19, 2000, http://www.conseilconstitutionnel.fr.
172. Case “Relating to Certain Aspects of the Laws on the Use of Languages in Education in Belgium” v. Belgium (No. 2), 6 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) at 31 (1968).
173. Id.
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ble relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the
aim sought to be realised.”174 Even though the Human Rights Committee
does not regularly refer to the term “proportionality,” its earlier method
of dispute analysis clearly reflected a balancing of the competing interests.175 Thus, it was unsurprising that Committee members Elisabeth
Palm, Ivan Shearer, and Iulia Antoanella Motoc used the phrase “proportionate to the legitimate aim” in their dissenting opinions in the
Haraldsson case.176
So, ultimately, “reasonable” means “proportionate to a legitimate aim.”
But the answers to the questions, “what will be found to be a legitimate
aim?” and, “what consequences will be found to be proportionate to that
aim?” still depend on the distinction at issue. An examination of comparative jurisprudence reveals that the level of scrutiny varies depending on
the nature of discrimination. For example, adjudicators require governmental bodies to provide much more compelling justifications if drawing
distinctions on the basis of race as compared to gender.177 But a more
compelling justification is required for gender distinctions than for those
based on property.178 It is impossible to conceive of any justification for
de jure discrimination on the basis of race, but the idea of common but
differentiated responsibility under socioeconomic legislation may very
well justify distinctions based on property. In other words, the exact
standard of justification should depend on the specific ground of discrimination at issue. The more a distinction jeopardizes the recognition of
fundamental rights, the more demanding the scrutiny of its “reasonableness.” As explained, this is a common theme in constitutional jurisprudence.179 For instance, the use of the term “suspect classification” in U.S.
equal protection analysis reflects the understanding that certain distinctions, such as race, are not acceptable and, therefore, presumptively

174. Id.; see also Morales de Sierra v. Guatemala, Case 11.625, Inter-Am. C.H.R.,
Report No. 4/01, OEA/Ser./L/V/II.111, doc. 20 rev. ¶ 31 (2001). For a discussion of the
African system, see U. O. Umozurike, Equality and Non-Discrimiantion under the African Charter, in GLEICHHEIT UND NICHTDISKRIMINIERUNG IM NATIONALEN UND
INTERNATIONALEN MENSCHENRECHTSSCHUTZ 17183 (Rüdiger Wolfrum ed., 2003).
175. See cases cited supra note 6.
176. Haraldsson and Sveinsson, supra note 8, at 22; see also id. at 25 (in his dissenting
opinion, Committee member Yuji Iwasawa concluded that the disadvantages of the regulation were not disproportionate to the advantages).
177. Choudhury, supra note 3, at 43; Janneke H. Gerards, Intensity of Judicial Review
in Equal Treatment Cases, 51 NETHERLANDS INT’L L. REV. 135, 164–66 (2004).
178. Choudhury, supra note 3, at 27; Gerards, supra note 177, at 172.
179. See, e.g., Garlicki, supra note 170, at 9.
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invalid.180 A high threshold of justification and a particularly careful
analysis is required in such cases.181
This balancing approach can also be recognized in international case
law. According to the European Court of Human Rights, discrimination
on the basis of race or ethnicity is particularly invidious, and, therefore,
no difference in treatment will be justified if it is based exclusively on
those immutable traits.182
A heightened level of justification is also usually sought with respect
to gender discrimination. The Human Rights Committee explained in
Müller and Engelhard v. Namibia183 that differential treatment based on
gender “places a heavy burden on the State party to explain the reason
for the differentiation.”184 The European Court of Human Rights asks for
“very weighty reasons” as well when it comes to gender discrimination.185
However, in cases involving distinctions based on property—i.e., purely
economic distinctions—the Committee’s analysis should be more
deferential.186 The Committee should follow Yuji Iwasawa’s approach—
explained in Iwasawa’s dissenting opinion in the Haraldsson case—and
state actors should be afforded wide latitude in devising economic regulatory policies.187 Such government action should not be found imper180. For a critical evaluation of the “per se” test and the “color blindness” theory, see
Sadurski, supra note 115, at 74–84.
181. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); see also Haraldsson and Sveinsson, supra
note 8, at 25–26.
182. D.H. v. Czech Republic, App. Co. 57325/00, (2006), http://www.echr.coe.int/
echr/Homepage_EN.
183. Müller and Engelhard v. Namibia (Communication No. 919/2000), reprinted in
Hum. Rts. Comm., Report of the Human Rights Committee, at 243, U.N. Doc. No.
A/57/40 (Jan. 1, 2002).
184. Id. at. 243, para. 6.7.
185. Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v. United Kingdom, 94 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A)
at 31–32 (1985). This high standard of review is also applied to treatment based exclusively on the ground of nationality. See Gaygusuz v. Austria, 1996-IV Eur. Ct. H.R.
1129.
186. For example, in the case “Relating to Certain Aspects of the Laws on the Use of
Languages in Education in Belgium” v. Belgium, the European Court of Human Rights
applied a low standard of review by requiring a “reasonable relationship of proportionality.” Case “Relating to Certain Aspects of the Laws on the Use of Languages in Education
in Belgium” v. Belgium (No. 2), 6 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) at 31 (1968); see also Swedish
Engine Drivers’ Union, 20 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) at 14 (1976) (noting that differential
treatment may be justified by a legitimate aim). See generally, J.H. GERARDS, JUDICIAL
REVIEW IN EQUAL TREATMENT CASES (2005).
187. Committee member Iwasawa explained that, “[s]tates should be allowed wider
discretion in devising regulatory policies in economic areas. . . . The Committee should
be mindful of its own expertise in reviewing economic policies that had been formed

2010]

THE RISE OF EQUALITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

33

missible under Article 26 under the rubric of unfairness. This was also
the position of Committee member Sir Nigel Rodley, who recognized the
insufficient capacity of an international body to master the issues at stake
in economic regulations and, therefore, conceded deference to the State
party’s arguments.188 It is telling that, even under the most stringent
domestic law standard of review, deference is still given to the legislature
when it comes to purely economic matters.189 As mentioned above, under
the “new formula” of the German Federal Constitutional Court, a more
lenient standard of review is exercised in these matters.190 Distinctions
neither based on discriminatory grounds nor deemed to affect a fundamental right are tested only for manifest inappropriateness.191 In this
respect, German jurisprudence is similar to that of many other jurisdictions. A comparison of domestic constitutional jurisprudence reveals that
distinctions involving purely economic matters are usually upheld.192
It is difficult to understand why international human rights protection
should go further in developing overly stringent standards of equal protection scrutiny. Presumably, this is due to a misunderstanding of the
term “reasonable,” which is inherently vague. The Human Rights Committee should therefore enhance its doctrinal understanding of Article 26
with a focus on refining the term “reasonable” as used in nondiscrimination analysis, in order to ultimately differentiate its analytical approach
according to the intensity with which unequal treatment affects fundamental rights.193

carefully through the democratic process.” Haraldsson and Sveinsson, supra note 8, at
25–26.
188. Id. at 24; see also, Sadurski, supra note 115, at 72 (stating that “the ideal of equality in the law is narrower and more specific than an ideal of overall justness.”).
189. See, e.g., Carolene Products Co. v. United States, 344 U.S. 144 (1944).
190. Eberle, supra note 106, at 2100.
191. The “new formula” only provides for a more stringent standard of review if basic
rights are affected and if discrimination is based on grounds similar to those listed in
Article 3, paragraph 3 of the Constitution. Apart from this, an arbitrariness test is applied.
Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Oct. 7, 1980, 55
Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 72 (89) (F.R.G.). The regulation at issue in Haraldsson and Sveinsson v. Iceland would not be invalidated on the basis
of equal protection. For the jurisprudence under the “new formula” in general, see Sachs,
supra note 120, at 15253.
192. Baer, supra note 116, at 257.
193. This does not duplicate the fundamental rights analysis. Equal protection becomes
relevant if the analysis reveals that there has not been a violation. This is particularly
relevant in cases in which a State party goes beyond the standards of the Covenant and
makes distinctions between different groups of people.
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2. Standards of Review or a Sliding Scale?
By standardizing the review according to the severity of the discrimination—an approach comparable to that of the U.S. Supreme Court,
which distinguishes between suspect, quasi-suspect, and other classifications194—the Committee could generate a more coherent equal protection
doctrine. The respective standards would each specify permissible aims,
as well as the proper means-to-ends relationship. The U.S. standard of
review ranges from “strict scrutiny” to deferential “rational basis” review: strict scrutiny review applies to suspect classifications and infringements of fundamental rights;195 intermediate scrutiny applies to
quasi-suspect classifications;196 and rational basis review applies to nonsuspect classifications.197 Under strict scrutiny review, statutory distinctions based on race and alienage can only pass muster if they serve a
compelling state interest and are narrowly tailored to achieve that designated interest.198 The intermediate standard of review—applied, for
example, to classifications based on gender and illegitimacy—requires a
substantial connection between the classification and an important government objective.199 And rational basis review—the least rigorous standard, which applies to nonsuspect distinctions such as economic status—
requires merely that the given statutory means be rationally related to the
achievement of a legitimate legislative aim.200
194. This approach has not gone unchallenged in the United States. For example,
Justice Thurgood Marshall advocated a “sliding scale” methodology, which entails that
the intensity of judicial review should vary depending on the value of the particular interest or individual right affected and the importance of the legislative goal. Mass. Bd. of
Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 321 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
195. The fundamental rights analysis is applied to cases involving the right to family
relations, procreation, vote and travel. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Harper v. Va.
Bd. Of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
196. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). The Court has also indicated that a
less lenient standard of rationality review might be applied for instances of discrimination
based on sexual orientation, illegitimacy, and mental illness. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S.
620 (1996); Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 441 (1985); Trimble v.
Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 767 (1977).
197. See, e.g., U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980); Mass. Bd. of Ret., 427
U.S. at 307; Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Ry. Express Agency
v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949).
198. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
199. ‘Important’ means that a purpose needs to be less than compelling but more than
legitimate, where as ‘substantial’ means that the classification must be more than reasonable but less than the almost perfect fit between ends and means, which is required for
suspect classifications. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. at 190.
200. See Carolene Products Co. v. United States, 344 U.S. 144, 152, n.4 (1944).
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The advantage of this approach—as compared to proportionality
analysis or the sliding scale method pursued by Continental European
courts and the European Court of Human Rights201—is standardization. It
arguably renders judicial outcomes more predictable and perhaps even
more rational.202 The flexible standards and the case-by-case approach
found in the German Federal Constitutional Court and the European
Court of Human Rights case law have been criticized as lacking doctrinal
coherence and predictability and leaving too much room for judicial
value judgments.203 On the other hand, a certain degree of subjectivity
will always exist with any method of nondiscrimination analysis.204 Even
in the United States, the questions of whether a classification is suspect
or quasi-suspect, and whether a classification serves an important objective, both require judgments of value.205 Further, what may seem to be a
standardized level of scrutiny may vary in its application to individual
cases.206 In practice and implementation, the difference between the
European sliding scale approach and the U.S. standard of review
approach is almost insignificant. Even though the European approach
lacks formally standardized levels of scrutiny, the jurisprudence of these
Courts effectively reflects varying degrees of scrutiny depending on the
nature of the discrimination and its implications. The outcomes of equal
protection cases in European domestic courts shows that distinctions
which impinge on the exercise of fundamental rights have a much harder

201. See Christian Walter, Gleichheit und Rationalität, in GLEICHHEIT UND
NICHTDISKRIMINIERUNG IM NATIONALEN UND INTERNATIONALEN MENSCHENRECHTSSCHUTZ 253, 258–62 (Rüdiger Wolfrum ed., 2003).
202. See Partsch, supra note 98, at 69.
203. See, Alexander Somek, The Deadweight of Formulae: What Might Have Been the
Second Germanization of American Equal Protection Review, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 284
(1998) (comparing the German Constitutional Court’s analysis with the U.S. Supreme
Court’s).
204. According to Dupuy, the determination as to whether a statute is reasonable requires an evaluation of socio-cultural elements, traditions, and mentalities. Pierre-Marie
Dupuy, Equality under the 1966 Covenants and in the 1948 Declaration, in GLEICHHEIT
UND NICHTDISKRIMINIERUNG IM NATIONALEN UND INTERNATIONALEN MENSCHENRECHTSSCHUTZ 149, 154 (Rüdiger Wolfrum ed., 2003).
205. Donal P. Kommers & Stephanie E. Niehaus, An Introduction to American Equal
Protection Law, in GLEICHHEIT UND NICHTDISKRIMINIERUNG IM NATIONALEN UND
INTERNATIONALEN MENSCHENRECHTSSCHUTZ 25, 38–39 (Rüdiger Wolfrum ed., 2003).
206. Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of
Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793 (2006); see also, Louis D.
Bilionis, The New Scrutiny, 51 EMORY L.J. 481 (2002).
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time surviving judicial scrutiny than discrimination based on purely economic categories.207
The difference between the two approaches should not be overstated. If
European scrutiny is more demanding in some areas, it is not due to a
difference of method. Rather, the variance is more appropriately attributable to different value judgments with respect to the invidiousness of a
classification. German jurisprudence, for example, is concerned with the
protection of vulnerable groups more generally and tends to exhibit a
different understanding of the role of the judiciary in shielding those
groups from what it perceives as harmful.208
What is important is that domestic and international courts realize that
the degree of their review must correspond to the invidiousness of the
discriminatory classification. As such, regardless of whether the Committee adopts a variable proportionality analysis or a standardized test, it
will need to fine-tune its analysis. In practice, the Committee has already
applied the “reasonable” test with varying intensity.209 A close look at the
Committee’s reasoning in particular cases shows that the standards of
justification have indeed varied.210 While a more lenient approach originally dominated judicial review of socioeconomic legislation, such that a
number of regulatory distinctions were upheld, more recent cases trend
toward increasing demands for justification, even when no fundamental
rights are at stake.211 The Committee should re-evaluate this trend and
take note of the varying standards it has applied in earlier cases. In order
to develop a balanced and consistent approach, it is high time to acknowledge the underlying rationale of equal protection and to structure
equal protection analysis accordingly.
Even if the Committee is not willing to develop a standardized test for
different categories of discrimination, the Committee must define the
contours of the “reasonableness” test, and, in doing so, must acknowledge that it is in fact utilizing a proportionality review in order to determine what is reasonable. As a matter of transparency, the Committee
should specify what aims are permissible, clarify the means-to-ends
relationship, and note that the standards will vary depending on the na-

207. Baer, supra note 116, at 260.
208. Id. at 256. Judicial self-restraint is not a common theme of European constitutionalism.
209. See cases cited supra note 6.
210. The Committee usually engaged in an intermediate standard of review, standing
somewhere between basic rationality and strict scrutiny. See cases cited supra note 6.
211. See Ando, supra note 3, at 213–22 (detailing accounts of relevant cases).
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ture of the discriminatory distinctions at issue.212 After all, the more a
distinction or its implications affect a fundamental human right, the more
rigorous the justification requirements for permissible state interests and
for the means-to-ends relationship. Finally, with respect to economic
matters, a deferential approach should be applied across the board.
CONCLUSION
Article 26 of the ICCPR comprises two elements of equality: equality
before the law (i.e., formal equality); and the principle of nondiscrimination (i.e., substantive equality of the law).213 In order to inject real meaning into the concept of equal protection, it is necessary to focus on the
enumerated grounds of impermissible discrimination as set forth therein.
The nondiscrimination rule renders the abstract notion of equality more
concrete because it indicates the criteria by which equality should be
granted; however, Article 26 does not provide for a principle of general
equality that supersedes the nondiscrimination grounds. The emphasis on
nondiscrimination is also the predominant approach in domestic constitutional law across a number of jurisdictions. The structural parallels of
equal protection rules in international human rights instruments and
national constitutions imply that comparative constitutional analysis is a
valuable tool for evaluating the meaning of the international nondiscrimination principle. After all, equal protection rules are based in the same
historical preoccupation with harnessing the control of State power in the
interest of protecting human rights.214 International equal protection is
thus yet another field in which comparative constitutional law can play a
significant role, and a shift toward such analysis offers mutual benefit for
all involved.
Thus far, the discussion in the United States has centered on the question of whether comparative constitutional analysis is a permissible tool
in the interpretation of national constitutional law.215 However, it is not
only domestic constitutional jurisprudence that stands to benefit from a
212. This appears to be implicit in the Committee’s evaluation of whether a regulation
is reasonable.
213. Unfortunately, General Comment No. 18 already seems to depart from the
assumption that Article 26 comprises three elements: equality before the law, equal protection of the law, and nondiscrimination. See General Comment No. 18, supra note 6, ¶
12. However, the discrimination principle is essentially a negative formulation of equal
protection of the law. See NOWAK, supra note 3, at 607–608.
214. See NOWAK, supra note 3, at 598.
215. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573 (2003). But see, id. at 598 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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consideration of the reflections of foreign and international institutions.
International jurisprudence can also take advantage of domestic constitutional interpretation, including the long standing experience of the U.S.
Supreme Court and other constitutional courts worldwide. This is particularly true with respect to equal protection analysis, given that it is a relatively new area of international law. Current trends in the interpretation
of the universal nondiscrimination principle seem, unfortunately, to lose
track of the theoretical underpinnings of equal protection analysis. There
is an urgent need for re-conceptualization, but this requires an effort by
all those working in this field of law.
Instead of continuing to criticize the Committee for applying Article 26
to non-Conventional rights, international law scholars and practitioners
should join in the development of a sound jurisprudential approach.
Drawing from a comparative analysis, this Article has attempted to
provide suggestions for the future realization of an international equal
protection framework. The Human Rights Committee should heed these
suggestions and, rather than extend the grounds of nondiscrimination
further, should instead allow a wider margin of deference to State parties
where less serious distinctions are being made. The Committee should be
confident that it is not its responsibility to venture into notions of general
equality. To interpret Article 26 as a principle of general equality, requiring sound and persuasive grounds for any kind of distinction, is not in the
interest of international human rights. The purpose of human rights
norms is to set basic standards for the enjoyment of fundamental rights
and freedoms, not to unduly limit legislative discretionary power by providing a judicially prescribed model for legislation.216
Whether legislation is generally reasonable largely depends on value
judgments that vary from nation to nation. What may be considered
unreasonable in western societies may have a reasonable explanation in
other settings. If equal protection on the international level is to be
regarded as a general measure in assessing the reasonableness of legislation, it would most certainly run into the trap of cultural imperialism. In
order to avoid such criticism, it is necessary to concentrate on universal
values. Fortunately, the grounds of nondiscrimination spelled out in
Article 26 stand for a universal consensus that discrimination based on
certain classifications cannot be tolerated.217 A stronger focus on the
specified grounds of nondiscrimination would guide equal protection

216. This is why it is not appropriate to apply the German equal protection model as a
structural element of constitutional law at the international level.
217. Compare ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 26, with discussion supra Part II.A.
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analysis along these well tread lines and help to reemphasize the validity
of Article 26 as a truly international human rights instrument.
The suggestions presented herein are not only relevant for the interpretation of Article 26 of the ICCPR, but also for the future of international
equal protection more generally. For example, interpretation of the parallel provisions in the American Convention on Human Rights218 and the
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights may well benefit from
this discussion.219 With Protocol No. 12 to the European Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms having
entered into force in 2005, the European Court of Human Rights is also
about to deal with similar questions.220 The trials and errors of its counterparts can help the Court develop a thoughtful and reasoned approach
to this issue.221 If only one lesson is to be passed on, let it be that the
principle of equal protection should not be misunderstood as a principle
of general equality. Rather, the principle of equal protection should be
afforded a narrow nuanced interpretation, such that it may be rendered a
truly universal principle.

218. The Inter-American Court has only dealt with nondiscrimination in two advisory
opinions. See Proposed Amendments to the Naturalization Provisions of the Constitution
of Costa Rica, Advisory Opinion OC-4/84, Inter-Am. C.H.R. (ser A) No. 4, (Jan. 19,
1984), paras. 53–59; Exceptions to the Exhaustion of Domestic Remedies (Art. 46(1),
46(2)(a) and 46(2)(b) of the American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion
OC-11/90, Inter-Am. Ct HR (ser A) No. 11 (Aug. 10, 1990), para. 22. For the InterAmerican Commission of Human Rights’ interpretation of Article 24, see Morales de
Sierra v. Guatemala, Case 11.625, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 4/01, OEA/
Ser./L/V/II.111, doc. 20 rev. ¶ 31 (2001); see also Thomas Buergenthal, Nondiscrimination and Equal Protection in the Inter-American System, in GLEICHHEIT UND
NICHTDISKRIMINIERUNG IM NATIONALEN UND INTERNATIONALEN MENSCHENRECHTSSCHUTZ 161, 161–70 (Rüdiger Wolfrum ed., 2003) (providing an overview of the nondiscrimination and equal protection doctrines under article 1, parargraph 1 and article 24
of the American Convention).
219. The African Charter provides for a broad principle of equality before the law
without specifying the forbidden grounds of discrimination. African Charter on Human
and Peoples’ Rights, concluded June 27, 1981, 1520 U.N.T.S. 217, art. 3; see also
Umozurike, supra note 174, at 17582 (discussing the African Commission’s application
of the equality and non-discrimination principles).
220. See generally European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 20 (dealing with the issue of values that can be
considered international human rights standards across all nations, without infringing
upon national law-making sovereignty).
221. Fortunately, article 1, paragraph 1 of Protocol No. 12, supra note 24, does not
provide for equality, but is limited to the rule of nondiscrimination.

